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Sovereign distressed debt investors can create holdout 
problems during sovereign restructurings. Scholars have 
suggested a wide-range of normative solutions to alleviate 
these holdout problems, including ad hoc deals, the creation 
of a multilateral international sovereign bankruptcy 
framework, the insertion of collective-action clauses into 
bonds, the expansion of judicial discretion, and the return of 
the doctrines of comity and sovereign immunity. However, 
national legislatures have increasingly begun to exhibit a 
preference for adopting national legislative solutions to this 
issue. In 2015, Belgium passed the broadest Anti-Vulture 
Funds Law to date, which is significant because the law 
impacts the Euroclear payment system. While this law has 
received high praise from the United Nations and from other 
nations also considering passing similar legislation, a careful 
analysis demonstrates it is not sensitive to the benefits that 
vulture funds bring, such as providing incentives to 
sovereigns to form more efficient capital structures, providing 
a moral hazard counterbalance, serving as liquidity-
providers on the secondary distressed-debt market, and 
providing information to the market. If adopted by other 
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nations, Belgium’s law can eliminate the secondary distressed 
debt market by blocking liquidity-providers from the market. 
As a result, national legislatures should avoid using 
Belgium’s law as model law, but rather, enact legislation that 
enhances active settlement discussions without compromising 
the bargaining power or rights of either the sovereign or the 
vulture funds. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long commented on the ability of sovereign 
distressed debt investors to create holdout problems during 
sovereign restructurings.1 Many have suggested a wide 
range of normative solutions to alleviate these holdout 
problems, including ad hoc deals, the creation of a 
multilateral international sovereign bankruptcy framework, 
the insertion of collective-action clauses into bonds, the 
expansion of judicial discretion, and the return of the 
doctrines of comity and sovereign immunity.2 Between 2008 
and 2016, however, national legislatures increasingly began 
to exhibit a preference for adopting national legislative 
solutions in favor of these other suggestions.3 
Unfortunately, scholarship on the efficacy of these 
national legislations remains scarce, and none exists on 
Belgium’s Anti-Vulture Funds Law, which passed in the 
Belgian Federal Parliament on July 12, 2015.4 Like earlier 
 
1 See infra Section II.C.1. 
2 See infra Section III.A. 
3 Id. 
4 Loi relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vauteurs [Anti-
Vulture Funds Law] of July 12, 2015, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official 
Gazette of Belgium] Sept. 11, 2015, 57357. For an English translation by 
the author, see infra Appendix A. 
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national pieces of legislation, Belgium’s Anti-Vulture Funds 
Law seeks to prohibit distressed debt investors who acquired 
the sovereign debt of poor countries from collecting fully on 
their investment.5 Belgium’s law in particular merits 
analysis both for its structure and its influence on the global 
community. The law’s scope is broad6 and impacts the 
Euroclear payment system, which is based in Belgium.7 
Moreover, a UN human rights report has hailed the law as 
model legislation,8 and other nations have debated following 
its example.9 As such, determining the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the Belgian Anti-Vulture Funds Law will 
shed light on past regulations and inform the discussion on a 
 
5 Id. 
6 See JACQUES RICHELLE, STRELIA, BELGIAN 2015 ANTI-VULTURE FUNDS 
LAW 1 (2016), https://www.strelia.com/sites/strelia.com/files/strelia_-
_belgian_2015_anti-vulture_funds_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5F7-SLXK]. 
7 See id. Euroclear is a Brussels-based clearinghouse that processes 
cross-border and domestic securities transactions. See About, EUROCLEAR,, 
https://www.euroclear.com/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/ZDT2-LBF2] 
(last visited June 4, 2017). 
8 See HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF VULTURE FUNDS AND THE 
IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11–12 (July 20, 2016),  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/Sessi
on17/A_HRC_33_54.docx [https://perma.cc/M3JA-82WJ] (“[I]t is evident 
that more national laws are needed to tackle this problem effectively”); see 
also Renaud Vivien, UNCTAD Organizes a Side-Event of the Second 
Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructurings, CADTM: COMMITTEE FOR 
THE ABOLITION OF ILLEGITIMATE DEBT (Oct. 27, 2017),  
http://www.cadtm.org/UNCTAD-organizes-a-side-event-of 
[https://perma.cc/JBW7-YM2R]. 
9 For example, the French legislature is currently debating anti-
vulture funds legislation. See infra Section III.G; see also Adrien Paredes-
Vanheule, France to Restrict Vulture Funds’ Claims, INVESTMENT EUROPE 
(June 3, 2016), http://www.investmenteurope.net/regions/ france/france-
restrict-vulture-funds-claims/ [https://perma.cc/V9AT-WXFD]. See 
generally Projet de Loi Relatif à la Transparence, à la Lutte Contre la 
Corruption et à la Modernisation de la Vie Économique, ESPACE PRESSE 
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201606/ 
le_senat_examine_la_loi_sapin_2.html [https://perma.cc/W23V-CXNA]. 
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large swath of the potential upcoming regulations in this 
area. 
While this Note acknowledges that national legislative 
solutions may not be the optimal solution to alleviate 
problems with sovereign distressed debt, their increasing 
prevalence indicates they have become the practical policy 
solution for many nations.10 This Note analyzes the Belgian 
Anti-Vulture Funds Law and queries both whether it 
provides efficient solutions to problems that vulture funds 
cause and whether it inhibits the positive functions they 
serve. This Note argues that the Belgian Anti-Vulture Funds 
Law is not sensitive to the benefits vulture funds bring, and 
if adopted by other nations, can eliminate the secondary 
distressed debt market by blocking liquidity-providers from 
the market. Such an answer inherently requires a weighting 
and balancing assessment of the value created by vulture 
funds solving a collective action problem on the one hand 
and the value lost or gained by vulture funds’ net effect on 
the cost of borrowing on the other. 
Part II of this Note provides an overview of what vulture 
funds are, their business model, and how they positively and 
adversely impact the market. Specifically, Part II examines 
how vulture funds serve as a moral hazard counterbalance, 
provide liquidity on the secondary distressed debt market, 
provide information to the market, and encourage sovereign 
states to adopt more efficient capital structures. Likewise, 
Part II also explores the holdout problems vulture funds 
introduce into voluntary sovereign restructuring 
proceedings, which can be amplified if vulture funds are 
 
10 Some scholars question whether the optimal solution requires any 
sort of regulation, or whether non-regulation itself is the best choice. 
These arguments tend to point out that there are only three outstanding 
vulture fund cases in litigation right now, and the creation of legislation 
governing such a small number of instances is exorbitantly costly. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Broomfield, Note, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government 
Caps on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
473, 517. While this Note recognizes the scholarly debate over whether 
any regulation is necessary, engaging in the debate goes beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
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empty creditors that are trading odious debt. Part III 
identifies and analyzes national legislation already enacted 
in the United Kingdom, Jersey, and Belgium, and 
summarizes the proposed legislations in the Isle of Man, 
Australia, the United States, and France. Part IV considers 
the Belgian law in the context of the benefits and costs of 
vulture funds identified in Part II. Part V offers concluding 
remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND ON BENEFITS OF AND 
PROBLEMS WITH VULTURE FUNDS 
A. What are Vulture Funds? 
“Vulture funds” are hedge funds or private equity funds 
that specialize in distressed debt investing or forced sale 
assets.11 Their business model is to buy the debt of insolvent 
or struggling sovereigns at bargain prices from original 
 
11 Peter Moles & Nicholas Terry, The Handbook of International 
Financial Terms, OXFORD REFERENCE (2005), 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198294818.001.00
01/acref-9780198294818-e-8301?rskey=PSeUUF&result=1 [https://perma. 
cc/RD6Q-CAS7]. Debt is generally considered distressed when its yield to 
maturity is more than 1000 basis points above the risk-free rate of return 
and receives a CCC rating from Moody’s. INVESTING IN DISTRESSED 
SECURITIES, BARCLAYHEDGE, http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/ 
educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fund-strategy-
distressed-securities.html [https://perma.cc/8XAM-FEDS] (last visited 
June 4, 2017). Distressed securities are sometimes defined as “securities 
issued by entities that are already in default, under bankruptcy 
protection, or in distress and heading towards such a condition.” MERCER, 
HIGH YIELD AND DISTRESSED DEBT 10 n.2 (2016), https://www.mercer.com/ 
content/dam/mercer/attachments/global/investments/high-yield-and-
distressed-debt-mercer-april-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQK4-WFQK]. 
The pejorative public moniker has been reserved for funds that invest in 
sovereign, as opposed to corporate, distressed debt. Hedge funds known as 
vulture funds commonly invest in both corporate and sovereign distressed 
debt. Following the common parlance and to avoid confusion, the term 
“vulture fund” as used in this Note will refer exclusively to sovereign 
distressed debt funds and “vulture fund investments” will refer to 
investments in sovereign distressed debt here on out. 
WOZNY – FINAL  
No. 2:697]   NATIONAL ANTI-VULTURE FUNDS LEGISLATION 703 
creditors and seek to receive the full payment of the debt,12 
sometimes through aggressive and extensive litigation that 
the sovereign cannot afford.13 Thus, public opinion often 
labels these funds and their tactics predatory and immoral14 
because they swoop in, like vultures, to profit off the carcass 
 
12 See Distressed Debt, OAKTREE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
https://www.oaktreecapital.com/strategies/distressed-debt 
[https://perma.cc/U4WK-XUZ3] (last visited June 4, 2017) (Oaktree 
Capital receives significantly higher returns than initial investment by 
returning companies to financial viability through restructuring). 
13 See Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture 
Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 254 n.3 (2003). The International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) estimates that there have been only 112 sovereign debt litigations 
since 1982, of which the number of successful litigations has been quite 
small. Furthermore, even when a creditor won a judgment, it still had to 
find assets to execute the judgment, and many sovereign assets continue 
to be protected by sovereign immunity protections. See MONETARY AND 
CAPITAL MARKETS DEPARTMENT, IMF, A SURVEY EXPERIENCES WITH 
EMERGING MARKET SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 11, 13 (June 5, 
2012), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/060512.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4CVH-PYZJ]. Vulture funds managers have indicated sensitivity 
to the moniker, and some have tried to reclaim their fund’s identity as 
more phoenix than vulture. For example, Wilbur Ross, owner of WL Ross 
& Corp. said in an interview, “The one term I don’t like to be called is a 
‘vulture.’ Because to me, a vulture is a kind of asset-stripper that eats 
dead flesh off the bones of a dead creature. Our bird should be the phoenix, 
the bird that reinvents itself, recreates itself from its ashes. And that’s 
much closer to what it is that we really do.” Wilbur Ross, I Am American 
Business, CNBC (2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100000729# [https:// 
perma.cc/TS89-KVLS]. 
14 See End the Vulture Culture, JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN 
http://jubileedebt.org.uk/campaigns/stop-vulture-funds [https://perma.cc/ 
N48A-GJD9] (last visited June 4, 2017); see, e.g., Martin Guzman, Wall 
Street’s Worst Vulture Hedge Funds Are Making a Killing by Undermining 
the Global Economy, QUARTZ (June 17, 2016), https://qz.com/707165/wall-
streets-vulture-hedge-funds-are-making-a-killing-by-undermining-the-
global-economy/ [https://perma.cc/S9QU-9XZF]; Argentina Edges Closer to 
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and at the expense of economic development in the sovereign 
state.15 
Many investors engage in this highly specialized form of 
investing. One study calculated that as of June 2016, private 
distressed debt fund managers held $63.3 billion in available 
capital, up from $28.2 billion in December 2006.16 Scholars 
have estimated the distressed debt market at more than 200 
financial institutions investing between $350–400 billion in 
U.S. distressed debt and substantially more outside of it,17 
and North American distressed debt investors have indicated 
they expect to invest even more capital next year.18 
Estimates of distressed sovereign debt are less clear. The 
amount of sovereign debt in default peaked in 1990 at $335 
billion.19 In 2003, about $125 billion of emerging markets 
sovereign debt traded at distressed levels.20 It is not clear 
 
15 See generally, Diana B. Henriques, The Vulture Game, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 19, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/19/magazine/the-vulture-
game.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/WK8T-JG5Q] (explaining 
that the term “vulture” comes from the analogy that these investors “get 
rich by feeding on the carcasses” of insolvent debtors). 
16 PREQIN, PREQIN QUATERLY UPDATE: PRIVATE DEBT: Q2 2016 7 (2016), 
https://www.preqin.com/docs/quarterly/pd/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Debt-
Update-Q2-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW5Q-5MW4]. 
17 Testimony from Edward L. Altman, Testimony before the ABI 
Chapter 11 Reform Commission 2 (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/17oct2012/Testimo
ny_ABI_2012_Conference.pdf [https://perma.cc/B99U-KAKS]. 
18 CORTLAND INVESTMENT SERVICING, NORTH AMERICAN DISTRESSED 




19 Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Debt Crises (Bd. 
Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance Discussion Papers No. 
1104, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1104/ 
ifdp1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6FV-4223]. 
20 Manmohan Singh, Recovery Rates from Distressed Debt—Empirical 
Evidence from Chapter 11 Filings, International Litigation, and Recent 
Sovereign Debt Restructurings 3 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/03/161, 
2003), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03161.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FZP4-5MG5]. 
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what percentage of that amount was held by vulture funds 
and what amount was held by other investors, such as other 
sovereigns. Regardless of the exact present amount, it is 
clear that any national or international regulation of vulture 
funds would affect an enormous amount of capital. 
B. Benefits Brought by Vulture Funds 
Any evaluation of the efficacy of national anti-vulture 
fund legislation first requires an understanding of the 
benefits and harms of vulture funds. Because public 
sentiment and media coverage present an overwhelmingly 
negative image of vulture funds,21 it is particularly 
important for policymakers to consider evidence that vulture 
funds do make markets more efficient. If the advantages of 
vulture funds are significant enough, national legislative 
action that broadly bans vulture funds may be costly. This 
section argues that vulture funds create numerous ex ante 
benefits. First, they provide incentives for corporations and 
sovereign states to promote more efficient capital structures. 
Second, they serve as a moral hazard counterbalance. Third, 
they provide liquidity on the secondary distressed debt 
market. And fourth, they serve as information-providers. 
These functions are highly valuable and result in a more 
efficient market. 
1. More Efficient Capital Structures 
Vulture funds confer to the sovereign distressed debt 
market many of the same benefits that corporate distressed 
debt investors bring to the corporate distressed debt 
markets. For example, corporate distressed shareholders can 
sometimes obtain financial leverage more cheaply 
themselves than the corporation, such as when the 
corporation is already over-levered and might go bankrupt. 
In such situations, the efficient choice by the managers 
would be to issue a dividend or buy back stocks. If the 
 
21 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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corporation’s creditors have no bargaining power or are not 
paying attention, the probability and costs to the corporation 
of financial distress may decrease,22 incentivizing managers 
to inefficiently issue additional debt. Sophisticated 
distressed debt investors, however, pay attention and 
provide an incentive for managers to consider properly the 
efficiency of issuing corporate debt. 
Similarly, vulture funds provide incentives that promote 
efficient capital structures and responsible financial 
behavior by sovereigns. Regardless of who the other market 
actors are, sovereigns always desire to raise money for 
investments in health, education, infrastructure, or 
development. To do this, the sovereign can take foreign-
currency denominated debt or issue domestic-currency 
claims.23 The optimal capital structure seeks an equilibrium 
between inflation costs and expected default costs that arise 
from the proportion of debt incurred versus currency 
issued.24 Vulture funds raise the expected costs of default. 
Their absence lowers such costs. Thus, without these 
sophisticated activist investors who seek to collect on their 
claims, the optimal ratio between debt incurred and currency 
 
22 See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN 
ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 455–72 (11th ed. 2014). 
23 See Patrick Bolton & Haizhou Huang, The Capital Structure of 
Nations 2 (Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-44, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2787982 
[https://perma.cc/Q9VH-LRRD]. While corporate finance scholars have 
explored what constitutes an efficient capital structure for corporations, 
Bolton is the first to explore what such a structure would look like in the 
sovereign-context. Bolton’s insight is that the “fiat money of a nation and 
other money-like debt claims may be seen as a close equivalent to the 
common stock of a corporation.” Id. Generally, this static trade-off theory 
is advanced for corporations, and pits the tax advantages of debt against 
expected costs of financial distress. Because debt has no tax advantages 
for nations, nations would never use debt under this theory. Thus, the 
more relevant corporate finance theory for nations is the pecking order 
theory, which states nations should fund their investments first with 
internal funds such as tax revenues, then with debt, and finally with 
equity (fiat money). Id. at 1–3. 
24 Id. at 1–8. 
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issued would inefficiently promote debt, over-borrowing, and 
perhaps even encourage default. This is because “[i]f realized 
output [from the investment] is too low relative to the 
nation’s debt burden then the nation prefers to default on its 
debt obligations even if it incurs a deadweight output loss as 
a result of the default.”25 Moreover, default is even more 
desirable if the sovereign’s bondholders do not reside within 
the sovereign itself because the sovereign will not have to 
bear all the costs of default.26 
Historical examples of sovereigns using irresponsible 
capital structures that are unchecked by or immune from the 
sovereigns’ collectors date back to at least the sixteenth 
century. For example, Spain did not have locally-held debts 
and became a serial defaulter in the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, suspending payments to creditors 
nine times in one hundred years.27 In the nineteenth 
century, Latin American republics discovered that it was 
“relatively painless to default when a substantial proportion 
of bondholders were foreign  . . . [and] the first great Latin 
American debt crisis happened [between] 1826–9, when 
Peru, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Guatemala and Argentina all 
defaulted on loans issued in London just a few years 
before.”28 
Some have argued that reputational harm and 
increasingly limited access to global capital markets may 
 
25 Id. at 6. 
26 See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL 
HISTORY OF THE WORLD 99 (2008). In this scenario, the defaulting 
sovereign would not bear all the costs because the sovereign in which the 
bondholders reside would be partially responsible for the economic 
externalities of the defaulting sovereign’s default. On the other hand, of 
course, if the bondholders had resided in the defaulting sovereign, the 
defaulting sovereign would not only have to deal with its own financial 
position but also with that of its own citizens. 
27 Id. at 74. Payments were suspended in the following years: 1557, 
1560, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1652, and 1662. Id. 
28 Id. at 98. 
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discourage sovereigns from defaulting.29 However, 
reputational harm is an inadequate constraint. First, 
reputational harm from default has not sufficiently deterred 
opportunistic defaults historically.30 Second, sovereigns that 
serially default may disregard any marginal harm an 
additional default might cause. Furthermore, increasingly 
limited access to the global capital market might not 
properly incentivize a sovereign where the costs of domestic 
inflation outweigh the higher costs of raising debt on a 
limited capital market. Such a sovereign will try to raise 
money but will avoid doing this by issuing currency. The 
sovereign will also be risk-tolerant of deleterious 
consequences that might arise from default, like limited 
access to the global capital markets, because the alternative 
is always more expensive. Sophisticated vulture funds, 
however, can raise the costs of default exorbitantly by 
holding out, thereby adjusting this equation and perhaps 
properly realigning the sovereign’s incentives.31 
Finally, another ex ante benefit provided by vulture funds 
on sovereign capital structures is preventing inefficient 
restructurings altogether. Scholars scrutinize the holdout 
and free-rider problems brought by vulture funds during the 
restructuring.32 By starting the analysis at the time of the 
bankruptcy, however, one potentially overlooks the fact that 
some sovereign restructurings may never have occurred 
because of the vulture funds’ deterrent-effect. An 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) article indicates that 
there were only 14 lawsuits by vulture funds against 
sovereigns of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in 
2008, down from 33 in 2007.33 These relatively low numbers 
 
29 Molly Ryan, Note, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Why Now and Why Not In 
the IMF, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2473, 2486–87 (2014). 
30 Broomfield, supra note 10, at 514; see also supra notes 26–27 and 
accompanying text. 
31 See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra Section II.C.1. 
33 INT’L DEV. ASS’N & IMF, HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) 
INITIATIVE AND MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE (MDRI)—STATUS OF 
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might be explained by ex ante deterrent effects. If countries 
know ex ante that a sophisticated creditor may litigate its 
claims and potentially hold out from the restructuring, 
thereby locking the sovereign out of the global capital 
market, this might alone promote more efficient capital 
structures. 
2. Moral Hazard Counterbalance 
Vulture funds’ actions may resolve another market 
problem by positively serving as a moral hazard 
counterbalance with respect to sovereign default. Moral 
hazard refers to any situation in which one party makes 
decisions about how much risk to take while another party 
bears the cost of that decision.34 The classic example is a too-
big-to-fail bank that takes unwarranted risks because it 
knows or expects a bailout to prevent the consequences of its 
risk-taking from affecting the global economy. Sovereign 
states that expect a bailout in the form of debt relief from the 
IMF or other sources also suffer from problems of moral 
hazard. The moral hazard of default stalks markets and 
burdens every contract with unnecessary uncertainty, which 
raises the cost of capital.35 Even financially responsible 
sovereigns will suffer higher borrowing costs simply if they 
choose to raise debt, regardless of whether or not the 
sovereign had a low risk of default.36 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 20 (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/091410.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA8U-CX7U]. 
34 See PAUL KRUGMAN, RETURN TO DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE 
CRISIS OF 2008, at 63 (2009). 
35 Review and Outlook, Decade of Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
25, 1998, 12:01 AM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB906674661676514000 
[https://perma.cc/9TA4-WQLS]. 
36 Robin Moroney, The Debate Over Vulture Funds, WALL ST. J.: THE 
INFORMED READER (June 19, 2007, 5:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
informedreader/2007/06/19/vulture-funds-do-some-good-work/ 
[https://perma.cc/CX6J-AJ6S]. 
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Vulture funds counter the moral hazard of default by 
vigorously pursuing their claims against sovereigns, even 
going so far as to block sovereigns out of capital markets. 
Knowing ex ante that vulture funds will litigate their claims 
and cause significant damage to the sovereign and its 
citizens changes the incentive structure and behavior of the 
sovereign.37 Without vulture funds, for example, sovereigns 
may implement reckless fiscal policies that are dependent 
upon an expectation of some bailout in the form of debt relief 
from the IMF. But knowing that vulture funds will litigate 
their claims and potentially recover such a bailout, or 
prevent the feasibility of such a bailout, sovereigns may 
exercise restraint and implement long-term solutions. 
Therefore, the ex ante incentives vulture funds create by 
functioning properly generate a moral hazard 
counterbalance that prevents the cost of borrowing from 
rising unnecessarily, which allows sovereigns to invest in 
development more cheaply. 
3. Liquidity-Providers on the Secondary 
Distressed Debt Market 
Vulture funds also serve as an important source of 
liquidity on the secondary market for distressed sovereign 
debt,38 which developed during the late 1980s and early 
1990s due to an international debt crisis.39 This crisis was 
rooted in the late 1970s and early 1980s when banks lent 
unprecedented amounts of money to Latin American 
nations.40 Believing that sovereigns were experiencing only a 
temporary liquidity crunch, these banks then rescheduled 
these loans at least four times during the 1980s as 
 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: 
The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1043, 1064–65 (2004). 
40 See Phillip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary 
Market and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2701, 2707 (1996). 
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sovereigns failed to pay the interest.41 By the late 1980s, the 
banks realized that the sovereigns would never be able to 
repay their debt fully. 42 However, the banks could not afford 
to write off the losses because they lacked sufficient reserves 
to cover their losses.43 To avoid financial ruin and to reduce 
their exposure, banks sold sovereign debt at significantly 
discounted prices.44 The market actors who bought the 
banks’ sovereign debt and helped prevent their failure were 
the vulture funds.45 Without a sophisticated market actor for 
whom the claims had higher value than for the banks, the 
international debt crisis may have amplified. The flexibility 
afforded by vulture funds to financial institutions and to 
other sovereign states continues to this day. Indeed, the 
continued utility of vulture funds as liquidity-providers on 
the secondary distressed sovereign debt market should be 
carefully considered before any policies are implemented. 
Even in markets where a fragmented creditor structure 
already existed before the entrance of vulture funds, vulture 
funds still provide liquidity for distressed debt.46 The original 
creditors may not have the financial backing to defend their 
legal rights in the bond. Without a distressed debt market, 
they may lose their entire investment, and the sovereign 
would automatically receive a windfall.47 Because of their 
sophistication and ability to litigate, vulture funds value 
distressed debt more than individuals do, and the prices 
vulture funds pay creditors may be higher than creditors 
 
41 Id. at 2713–14. 
42 Id. at 2715–16. 
43 Id. at 2710–11. 
44 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 39, at 1067; see also Power, supra note 
40, at 2716. 
45 Power, supra note 40, at 2702. 
46 Fisch & Gentile, supra note 39, at 1047 (“Holdout creditors also 
provide value independent of the restructuring process by increasing 
liquidity in the market for sovereign debt, especially distressed debt.”). 
47 Felix Salmon, In Defense of Vulture Funds, FELIX SALMON (Feb. 24, 
2007), http://www.felixsalmon.com/2007/02/in-defense-of-vulture-funds/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZHE-WNBR]. 
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expect to recover.48 This makes individual creditors willing 
sellers and vultures willing buyers of distressed debt, 
allowing “investors in a country to make back some of their 
investments at times of crisis.”49 Vulture funds allow 
bondholders expecting no recovery to receive a “non-
negligible recovery value on their defaulted paper.”50 
Holdout vulture funds help maintain the viability of 
sovereign debt markets by providing a check on 
opportunistic defaults and coercive restructuring offers.51 By 
holding corrupt and irresponsible sovereigns accountable, 
vulture funds enable the distressed debt market to work 
more efficiently.52 
4. Information-Providers 
Vulture funds also help financial markets operate more 
efficiently by providing information that would otherwise go 
unnoticed. Individual creditors with small claims lack the 
means or incentives to conduct their own independent 
research on a sovereign’s capital structure and spending 
habits prior to their investment. After their investment, 
individual creditors might find this type of analysis 
particularly inefficient because their position and options 
will not be affected by the news. If the sovereign does not 
default, these fragmented creditors’ claims will not suffer. If 
the sovereign does default, such creditors often lack 
adequate resources to litigate their rights.53 
By contrast, sophisticated institutional distressed debt 
investors, like vulture funds, invest huge amounts in 
distressed debt and wield massive litigation coffers and 
 
48 See generally id. 
49 See Moroney, supra note 36. 
50 See Salmon, supra note 47. 
51 Broomfield, supra note 10, at 514. 
52 See generally David Bosco, The Debt Frenzy, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 
11, 2007), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/the-debt-frenzy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/K6WS-UN8R]; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
53 See supra Section II.B.3. 
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experience holding sovereigns accountable. Because of their 
sizable positions, vulture funds have an incentive to conduct 
extensive pre-investment research to determine that they 
are acquiring debt that can actually be repaid.54 Even after 
the initial investment, vulture funds remain committed to 
investigating the sovereign’s spending patterns, locating all 
seizable assets, and valuing the expected payoff.  Thus, 
unlike the individual creditors, vulture funds have the 
financial means to litigate their claims in exchange for 
higher returns. 
In conducting their research, vulture funds provide 
valuable information to investors by signaling which claims 
are recoverable and which are not. Their departure from a 
market might also signal the strength of the sovereign’s 
economy.55 Vulture funds may also expose clandestine 
corruption in sovereigns that abuse international debt relief 
efforts for their personal benefit. Elliott Associates’ team of 
private detectives and forensic accountants, for example, 
discovered massive corruption by the Brazzaville-Congo 
government that included spending more than £112,000 total 
by Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso, the son of the previous 
dictator of Brazzaville, including £1,600 at Escada, £3,700 at 
Christian Lacroix, £4,000 at Ermenegildo Zegna, and £3,200 
at Louis Vuitton.56 Vulture funds also uncovered that 
Sassou-Nguesso illicitly purchased multiple flats in 
downtown Paris totaling £3.6 million and ran up a hotel bill 
of £169,000—£100,000 of which was paid in cash—during a 
recent visit to the United Nations, all while repeatedly 
claiming his country lacked any resources to repay its 
 
54 See Tony Allen-Mills, Hedge Funds Lift the Lid on African 
Deception, ALEXANDER’S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS (June 15, 2008, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/africa/67c4ba36f57496c01738bf41816f68e6 
[https://perma.cc/WCR5-KQVB]. 
55 See Fernando Barciela, Vulture Funds Leave Spain in Search of 
Fresh Game, THE CORNER (Aug. 17, 2016), http://thecorner.eu/spain-
economy/vulture-funds-leave-spain-in-search-of-fresh-game/57062/ 
[https://perma.cc/3H95-2UR6] (interpreting vulture funds’ departure from 
Spain as an indication of Spain’s road to recovery). 
56 See Allen-Mills, supra note 54. 
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debts.57 Furthermore, vulture funds determined that 
Brazzaville-Congo “had established a network of sham 
companies and bogus executives” to conceal oil transactions 
that implicated both the president and his son.58 Finally, 
vulture funds identified the middlemen who facilitated 
corrupt payments and traced the money trail from British oil 
traders to luxury boutiques in Paris.59 In doing so, Elliott 
arguably did more to expose corruption in Africa than any 
other organization.60 
C. How the Uniqueness of Sovereign Debt Introduces 
Potential Inefficiencies 
Based on these salutary effects, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that vulture funds should be targeted by specific 
regulations. However, legislatures that regulate vulture 
funds are not just responding to public outcry; their decisions 
are also founded upon legitimate concerns about market 
inefficiencies created by vulture funds. Many of these 
concerns arise from the uniqueness of sovereign debt. For 
example, both sovereign states and corporations issue debt to 
finance ongoing expenses and new capital projects. But if 
corporations over-borrow and need to restructure, 
bankruptcy codes create a mandatory process for their 
creditors to prevent collective action and holdout problems. If 
a sovereign state gets into a financial debacle, however, no 
global bankruptcy code exists to standardize the legal 
process for its restructuring. Thus, a sovereign’s ability to 
restructure its obligations depends upon the voluntary 
participation of its creditors. 
 
57 Id. 
58 Broomfield, supra note 10, at 517. 
59 See Allen-Mills, supra note 54. 
60 Broomfield, supra note 10, at 517. 
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1. Holdout Problem 
Vulture funds have strong incentives to refuse to 
participate in the sovereign debt restructuring. First, vulture 
funds understand that by withholding their consent, they 
will disrupt the restructuring and prevent the sovereign 
state from accessing international capital markets to obtain 
the financing necessary for development.61 As a result, these 
 
61 Argentina was locked out of the capital markets for 15 years while 
it publicly fought with approximately 200 holdout vultures, or about only 
7% of the creditors. See Julie Wernau, Argentina’s Debt Drama: How We 
Got Here, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Feb. 29, 2016, 5:55 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/02/29/argentinas-debt-drama-how-
we-got-here/ [https://perma.cc/9FYY-QMPY]. Immediately after 
negotiations, Argentina sold $16.5 billion in debt, of which $7.1 billion will 
be invested directly in construction of roads, ports, and other public 
infrastructure. Andres D’Alessandro & Chris Kraul, Argentina Pays Off 
‘Holdout’ Bondholders, Elevating Hopes for Economy, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-
argentina-economy-20160424-story.html [https://perma.cc/8GP6-EAB9]. 
This indicates a certain level of demand and need in the Argentinian 
economy to access capital markets. Indeed, Alfonso Prat-Gay, Argentina’s 
new finance minister, estimated that the 15-year litigation and lock-out of 
capital markets meant “$120bn worth of savings that did not save, and 
investments that did not come” and that Argentina lost 2 million jobs. 
John Authers, Oh What a Circus, Oh What a Show, Drama Not Over for 
Argentina, FIN. TIMES: THE LONG VIEW (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/57e3131c-030a-11e6-99cb-83242733f755. 
Moreover, while Argentina was locked out of capital markets, “the 
administration . . . finance[d] its fiscal deficit by printing money, which 
has continued to stoke inflation and inflationary expectations.” David 
Francis, After 15 Years, Argentina Agrees to Pay Back U.S. Creditors, 
FOREIGN POL’Y: THE CABLE (Mar. 31, 2016, 11:37 AM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/31/after-15-years-argentina-agrees-to-pay-
back-u-s-creditors/ [https://perma.cc/UNE7-7GRC]. Other empirical 
studies indicate that debt restructuring decreases GDP growth after 
default. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT 
DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISIS 51–52 (2006), for 
example, finds GDP grows at -0.6% because of debt restructuring due to 
default. Guido Sandleris approximates the impact at -1.5%. Guido 
Sandleris, The Costs of Sovereign Defaults: Theory and Empirical Evidence 
16–17 (Escuela de Negocios, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Working 
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profit-maximizing funds gain significant leverage to seek full 
repayment of the principal on their bond plus interest. 
Second, to the extent vulture funds buy the distressed debt 
after negotiations have already reached their final stages 
with other non-vulture fund creditors, they will hold out to 
seek even higher returns than the amount upon which the 
non-vulture fund creditors had just agreed to compensate for 
the transaction costs and risk undertaken.62 Furthermore, 
the tactics of a small handful of vulture funds can create this 
same holdout incentive in other creditors. Bondholders may 
become less willing to negotiate if they believe vulture funds 
will receive higher benefits and may hold out themselves, 
free-riding on the resources of the vulture funds to litigate 
further. The result might be a Pareto inefficient negotiation 
and restructuring.63 In fact, such tactics inherently prevent 
sovereigns from accomplishing the fundamental goal of 
restructuring. If everyone knows that a holdout can obtain 
full repayment, everyone will want that holdout and no one 
will want to restructure, especially if the transaction costs 
will be covered by the capital-rich vulture funds.64 Thus, 
holdouts are a source of market inefficiency.65 Vulture 
 
Paper 02/2012), https://ideas.repec.org/p/udt/wpbsdt/2012-02.html 
[https://perma.cc/J2MX-F8UJ]. 
62 This happened in Argentina when the country defaulted on the 
bonds in 2001 and started debt restructuring in 2005. In 2008, more than 
three years after negotiations with creditors had already begun, Elliott 
Management, a vulture fund, purchased a substantial amount of 
Argentina debt on the secondary distressed debt market. See Arthur 
Phillips & Jake Johnston, Argentina vs. the Vultures: What You Need to 
Know, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES.: THE AM. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/argentina-vs-the-vultures-what-
you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/WKM6-7FSN]. 
63 Pareto efficiency refers to the economic state of allocating resources 
such that no single party’s situation can be improved without worsening 
some other party’s situation. 
64 See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 61, at 64. 
65 See JOANNA DREGER, BRUGES EUR. ECON. POL’Y, WHY IS SOVEREIGN 
DEBT RESTRUCTURING A CHALLENGE? THE CASE FOR GREECE 7 (2012), 
https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/beep24.pdf?download=1 [https://perma.cc/XW5M-YNQR]. 
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holdouts raise the costs of litigation, incentivize standby 
creditors to similarly hold out, and postpone the sovereign’s 
decision to restructure unsustainable debt, leading to 
avoidable higher costs.66 
In addition to creating the issues during the restructuring 
identified above, holdout vulture funds can create incentives 
for the sovereign that lead to an inefficient economic policy 
and the moral hazard problem.67 If a sovereign nation knows 
that any of its surplus output will immediately go into the 
pockets of holdout vulture funds, it may fail to exert 
sufficient policy effort to run an effective economy.68 
Specifically, the sovereign would be disincentivized from 
enacting reforms required to regain the ability to repay its 
debt.69 Second, this adjustment inefficiency may represent a 
moral hazard if the sovereign is too significant to fail and can 
expect to be bailed out by lending institutions hoping to 
prevent a wider economic downturn.70 In such cases, the 
sovereign’s taxpayers bear the burden of these costs brought 
on by holdout vulture funds.71 
2. Empty Creditor Hypothesis 
These holdout problems are potentially amplified if 
vulture funds are “empty creditors.” The empty creditor 
problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance in 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 7–8. 
68 See Andrew G. Haldane, Andrew Penalver, Victoria Saporta & 
Hyun Song Shin, Analytics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring 23 (Bank of 
England, Working Paper No. 203, 2003), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/working
papers/2003/wp203.pdf [https://perma.cc/J74V-F54V]. 
69 See Dreger, supra note 65, at 7–8. 
70 Id. 
71 John A.E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: 
International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 221, 222, 225 (2014). 
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the form of a credit default swap (“CDS”)72 against default 
but otherwise retains control rights in and outside of 
bankruptcy.73 Under limited circumstances, CDS contracts 
can lead to powerful ex ante market benefits74 and do not 
 
72 The mechanics of a CDS must be understood to understand the 
empty creditor problem. In a CDS,  
the protection seller agrees to make a payment to the 
protection buyer in a credit (default) event on a 
prespecified reference asset. In exchange for this promised 
payment, the protection seller receives a periodic premium 
payment from the buyer. The credit event may be the 
bankruptcy filing of the debtor, non-payment of the debt, 
and, in some CDS contracts, debt restructuring or a credit-
rating downgrade. In most cases the default payment is 
given by the difference between the face value of the debt 
due and the recovery value, which is either estimated from 
market prices over a prespecified period after default has 
occurred (typically 30 days), or based on a CDS settlement 
auction. Settlement of the contract can be a simple cash 
payment, or it may involve the exchange of the defaulted 
bond for cash.  
Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty 
Creditor Problem, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2617, 2618 (2011). 
73 See id. at 2617. For a discussion about the specific rights enjoyed by 
creditors that might lead to the empty creditor problem, see Yesha Yadav, 
Empty Creditors and Sovereign Debt: What Now?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 103, 
113 (2014) (“[S]overeign debt instruments generally give lenders a handful 
of powers that constrain sovereign behaviour. For example, lenders can 
stipulate negative pledge and pari-passu clauses to constrain sovereign 
borrowing capacity. They can accelerate repayment on debt where an 
event of default occurs such as when a sovereign breaches a negative 
pledge. This acceleration might trigger a cross-default across all debts 
owing to the lender. Invariably, the exercise of such creditor rights can 
place stress on a sovereign borrower, diminishing reputational standing 
and making it more difficult for the borrower to access capital markets.”). 
74 See Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 72, at 2619, 2622. For example, 
creditors with CDS may have a stronger bargaining power than creditors 
without CDS, which offsets the necessary risk premium in the cost of 
borrowing. Because of the existence of CDS creditors, firms are able to 
“increase their debt capacity. This means that in the presence of CDS, 
more positive net present value projects can receive financing ex ante. 
Also, projects that can be financed in the absence of CDS may get more 
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lead to gains from trade if the parties involved are risk-
neutral.75 However, in the context of a sovereign 
restructuring,76 holding a CDS while holding a claim against 
the sovereign separates the creditor’s control rights from her 
cash-flow rights and might create creditors who over-insure 
to over-cover their downside risk.77 This type of creditor 
either lacks an interest in the efficient continuation of the 
debtor or gains an incentive to intentionally push the debtor 
through an inefficient restructuring.78 In short, if creditors 
are insured through CDS, they stand to lose less in default 
and therefore are less forgiving in debt renegotiations.79 
In the case of holdout vulture funds, the ability of a 
creditor to profit on CDS and be made whole on the value of 
the debt by encouraging debtors to file for bankruptcy80 is 
 
efficient financing, as the presence of CDS lowers the borrower’s incentive 
to inefficiently renegotiate down payments for strategic reasons.” Id. 
75 See id. at 2622. 
76 The sovereign CDS market is about 20% the size of the overall CDS 
market. See Yadav, supra note 73, at 103, n.1. 
77 See Yadav, supra note 73, at 103. The entire CDS market was 
calculated to be approximately $24 trillion in notional value in June 2013. 
Id. at 109. For a discussion on the emergence of the CDS market and its 
impact on sovereign debt, see id. at 109–14. 
78 See Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 72, at 2617; see also Henry T.C. 
Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: 
Importance and Extensions, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 731–32 (2008) (offering 
legal analysis of the empty creditor hypothesis); IMF, A SURVEY OF 
EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 
16 (2012), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/060512.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UJL-2GAM] (“There is a view that CDS holders who 
also own the underlying bond would have an incentive not to participate in 
a pre-default debt exchange offer but would prefer to force a default that 
constitutes a credit event.”). 
79 See Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 72, at 2618; see also Yadav, supra 
note 73, at 104 (Protection sellers, i.e. the sell side on the CDS, assume the 
economic risk of the debtor’s distress and acquire incentives to promote 
debt discipline. Thus, these sellers robustly monitor debtors and reign in 
irresponsible lenders.). 
80 Is the ‘Empty Creditor’ Theory Itself Empty?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Dec. 21, 2009, 4:54 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/is-the-
empty-creditor-theory-just-empty/ [https://perma.cc/4QHH-8NVK]. 
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doubly problematic. First, empty creditor vulture funds 
holding CDS have an additional incentive to hold out from 
the negotiation past the market efficient point.81 Second, one 
can imagine a scenario—though one that is impossible to 
verify—in which vulture funds receive full or approximately 
full repayment and interest on their claim but continue 
holding out because their CDS recovery might be still 
greater. In such situations, there might be no vulture fund to 
“make whole.” 
Scholars continue to debate to what extent empty 
creditors damage markets. Some research certainly criticizes 
the empty creditors hypothesis in the sovereign debt context 
both generally and as they apply to vulture funds.82 These 
arguments contend that CDS-holding vulture funds, for 
example, face a very uncertain process and have no 
guarantee that their actions to push the sovereign state will 
be successful.83 Moreover, vulture funds do not always get 
the full payment. Sometimes, vulture funds may insure only 
against partial repayment and receive only partial 
repayment. 
While the likelihood of empty creditor vulture funds 
exploiting this imbalance is probably small, it does happen. 
 
81 Yadav, supra note 73, at 113 (“Empty creditors can also harbour 
perverse incentives regarding sovereign restructuring. They may be less 
willing to engage in a voluntary restructuring plan even where such a 
workout is beneficial for all parties as informal solutions are unlikely to 
trigger repayment on CDS.”). 
82 See generally id. at 114–15 (reputational concerns, including in the 
form of increased regulation, constrain empty creditors). But vulture funds 
have hardly changed their behavior as their reputations tank and national 
regulations increase; if anything, the sovereign relents because of 
reputational concerns. See Ryan, supra note 29, at 2488 (“Much of the 
academic literature on sovereign debt emphasizes this fact and assumes 
that creditors have little or no legal recourse against defaulting sovereigns 
and that the sovereign debt market only works at all because of various 
nonlegal mechanisms (including reputational concerns and political 
pressures).”); see also David Mengle, The Empty Creditor Hypothesis, 
ISDA RESEARCH NOTES, Nov. 3, 2009, at 1, 4–13 (questions the plausibility 
of the empty creditor hypothesis on logical, not empirical grounds). 
83 Yadav, supra note 73, at 104.  
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For example, in March 2012, CDS repayments were 
triggered in Greece’s restructuring.84 In 2014, about $1 
billion of CDS on Argentina were triggered when the nation 
failed to pay its debt.85 Elliot Management Corp., one of the 
vulture fund holdouts, was rumored to hold a substantial 
CDS portfolio related to the restructuring.86 
3. Odious Debt 
When vulture funds trade the distressed sovereign debt of 
impoverished states, they may exacerbate another market 
inefficiency that exists only in the sovereign context. 
Corporations, unlike sovereign states, can liquidate 
themselves and cease to exist as a legal entity if it is not 
feasible to continue existing.87 Moreover, corporate law 
restricts the range of corporate governance options, 
providing a relatively predictable and stable framework. By 
comparison, a sovereign state’s political system is oftentimes 
much more volatile. Furthermore, not only do regimes 
change, but entire political systems can change along with 
them as well. Thus, a newly formed democratic sovereign 
 
84 Id. at 105. 
85 Matt Levine, Today’s the Day for Argentina and Its Vultures, 
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ 
articles/2014-07-30/today-s-the-day-for-argentina-and-its-vultures 
[https://perma.cc/ZT79-UKSL]. 
86 The payout would be huge for Elliot; however, the mechanics of 
recovering on CDS for sovereign debt means recovery does not translate 
neatly in a 1:1 ratio. Rather, only about 70% of the value would be 
recovered. Id. Because recovery is less than 100%, it is unlikely that CDS 
would be used purely for insurance purposes with respect to sovereign 
debt. They are much more likely to be used by speculators/vulture funds. 
Moreover, “[e]ven when insurance is fairly priced and correctly anticipates 
the creditors’ potential value-destroying behavior in renegotiation, 
creditors have an incentive to over-insure.” Bolton & Oehmke supra note 
72, at 2622. Thus, even if the debt market prices the CDS accounting for 
the fact that debt might be held by empty creditors, creditors will still 
over-insure, leading to the same issue. 
87 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–83 (2012); Insolvency and Bankruptcy 
Code, No. 31 of 2016, INDIA CODE (2016), vol. 37. 
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state may inherit the self-serving debts incurred by the 
preceding dictatorship. This debt, known as odious debt, at 
best complicates and at worst endangers the new regime’s 
macroeconomic policies.88 
Odious debt refers to money borrowed by a regime in the 
name of the state, but then stolen or squandered by the 
regime’s dictator.89 The conditions sufficient for a debt to be 
considered odious include: the debt is incurred without the 
consent of the people, the debt accrues no benefit to the 
people, and these facts were known by creditors at the time 
the loan was made.90 There is no legal designation known as 
odious debt nor currently any official mechanism or 
recognized tribunal that could designate certain debt as 
odious.91 As such, “odious debt” refers to a doctrine that 
seeks to excuse these and other illegitimate debts from 
sovereign debt litigation. 
Almost by definition, odious debt is not Pareto efficient, 
and it is hard to imagine any scenario in which odious debt is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient either.92 Yet, vulture funds do not 
 
88 Caroline M. Gentile, Market for Odious Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 151, 151 (2010). 
89 Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The 
Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1201 (2007). 
90 See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, 
AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165–66 (1991); CTR. FOR 
INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 1 
(CISDL Working Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), 
http://cisdl.org/public/docs/pdf/Odious_Debt_Study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VY2S-U7C7] (odious debt as “contracted against the 
interest of the population of a state, without its consent and with the full 
awareness of the creditor”). Gentile traces these principles to the Paris 
Conference following the War of 1898 and argues the first application of 
the odious debt doctrine occurred in 1923 by Chief Justice Taft in an 
arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica. See Gentile, supra note 
88, at 155–56. 
91 See generally Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious 
Debt, 85 N.C.L. REV. 727, 729–30 (2007). 
92 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency refers to the economic state of allocating 
resources such that at least one party gains resources after all post-
reallocation losses are fully compensated. 
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discriminate against odious debt and trade it if financially 
profitable to do so.93 These characteristics make it highly 
unlikely that vulture funds bring efficiency into the market 
by trading odious debt. Generally, vulture funds provide ex 
ante incentives for sovereigns to implement better capital 
structures.94 The very fact that odious debt is incurred 
despite an active vulture fund presence in the market 
evidences that these ex ante incentives do not reach all 
dictatorships. Numerous reasons might explain this 
phenomenon. Overthrown dictatorships cannot be 
incentivized to adopt more efficient capital structures 
because they no longer exist, and generally, still-existing 
dictatorships cannot be incentivized to forego bad debt for 
personal gain because their legitimacy does not depend upon 
citizen satisfaction. Second, because taxpayers bear the 
burden of any litigation,95 and the dictator yields all private 
benefits from the debt, the dictator prefers bad debt. 
Moreover, reputational harm does not deter dictatorships 
from incurring debt either because dictatorships do not care 
about their reputation. Finally, the benefits of vulture funds 
exposing corruption96 are limited in the case of dictatorships 
because such corruption is rarely veiled in disguise and more 
probable.97 
 
93 Vulture Funds and the Threat to Debt Relief in Africa: A Call to 
Action at the G-8 and Beyond: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa and 
Global Health of H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) 
(statement of Donald M. Payne, Chairman, Subcomm. on Africa and 
Global Health of H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (“vulture funds take 
advantage of ambiguous international and domestic laws to collect on 
debts that were acquired by authoritarian regimes and that were not used 
in the legitimate interest of their people.”). 
94 See supra Section II.B.1. 
95 See Pottow, supra note 71, at 225–29. 
96 See supra Section II.B.4. 
97 See generally William Hallagan, Corruption in Dictatorships, 11 
ECON. GOVERNMENT 27 (2010). It is possible that the market prices in these 
biases accordingly when dealing with dictatorships and assumes 
corruption, thereby eliminating the need for evidence thereof. But see 
VINEETA YADEV & BUMBA MUKHERJEE, THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN 
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In addition to not contributing to a more efficient market, 
trading odious debt may be positively harmful. For example, 
vulture funds create a secondary market for odious debt, 
which may have implications for loans issued by 
governments that are structured as loans in form but not 
actually loans in substance.98 Official lenders may issue 
grants that appear to be loans and never expect to recover on 
this loan. If this loan is traded on the secondary market, 
form may win over substance and the intent of the original 
issuer will not matter. Furthermore, any capital used to 
repay distressed odious debt held by vulture funds is capital 
that cannot be invested in infrastructure and development in 
the sovereign, which will stifle progress and impact those 
already devastated by the previous government’s use of 
odious debt. This is especially troubling because much odious 
debt originates in heavily indebted poor countries (“HIPC”).99 
HIPC are a group of 36 countries with high levels of debt and 
poverty.100 In 1996, the World Bank and IMF jointly 
launched the HIPC Initiative, which provided debt-relief in 
order to free up resources for social spending in these 
impoverished nations.101 In many cases, the HIPC Initiative 
has been highly successful. The World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, the IMF, the Inter-American 
 
DICTATORSHIPS (2015) (arguing that dictatorships are not necessarily 
synonymous with extreme corruption). 
98 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Vultures, Hyenas, and African Debt: 
Private Equity and Zambia, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 643, 664 (2009) 
(explaining that some debt incurred by developing countries is really a 
grant disguised as a loan). 
99 See generally Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious 
Debt: Report, BROOKINGS INST. (July 15, 2002), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/odious-debt/ [https://perma.cc/5X7A-
HQLU]. 
100 IMF, DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES 
(HIPC) INITIATIVE, http://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/ 
08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-
Initiative?pdf=1 [https://perma.cc/LH5D-M6G3] (Apr. 17, 2017). 
101 Id. The number of HIPC countries may increase from 36 because 
there are still three pre-decision-point HIPCs, including Eritrea, Somalia, 
and Sudan. Id. 
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Development Bank, and All Paris Club creditors have 
provided their full share of debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative,102 which totals over $76 billion in debt relief.103 As 
a result, HIPC countries increased their poverty-reducing 
expenditures by more than three percentage points of GDP 
between 2001 and 2009.104 
While the HIPC Initiative seeks voluntary support and 
most organizations have done so, vulture funds have offered 
the HIPC Initiative limited support.105 As a result, some 
have argued that vulture funds free-ride on debt relief and 
target nations who suddenly have more access to cash 
because of the HIPC Initiative.106  In doing so, vulture funds 
convert the “benefits of international relief into private 
corporate gain, obstructing the process of securing debt relief 
for some countries and prohibiting others who have attained 
debt relief from investing their funds in much needed 
development.”107 The World Bank estimates that more than 
one-third of the countries which have qualified for HIPC debt 
relief have been targeted by vulture funds with judgments 
totaling $1 billion.108 As a result, the HIPCs have been forced 
to pay for costly litigation. Such litigation has been said to 
 
102 Id. 
103 INT’L DEV. ASS’N & IMF, supra note 33, at 12. 
104 Id. at 11. By reducing expenditures on debt service, sovereign 
states free up capital to invest in development and infrastructure. See 
Vulture Funds and the Threat to Debt Relief in Africa, supra note 93, at 2 
(“[I]nstead of servicing millions of dollars in debt annually, these nations 
could finally begin to service their own people.”). 
105 See IMF, supra note 100 (participation from non-Paris Club and 
multilateral creditors needs to improve). 
106 See Vulture Funds and the Threat to Debt Relief in Africa, supra 
note 93, at 16. 
107 Id. at 4. 
108 Id. at 2, 4 (over 20 HIPC countries have been the target of these 
funds since 1999); see also Vulture Funds in the Sovereign Debt Context, 
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“undermine international debt relief initiatives or 
restructuring mechanisms” and has been called 
“predatory.”109 As litigation costs rise, HIPC countries miss 
goals and fail objectives in education and health-related 
sectors.110 Indeed, studies estimate that the lawsuits against 
the HIPC cost these countries the equivalent of 18% of 
spending on health care and education.111 
III. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL 
ANTI-VULTURE FUND LEGISLATION 
A. Background to the Growing Trend of Using 
National Legislation as the Policy Solution to 
Vulture Funds 
These unsavory elements of vulture funds have elicited a 
public outcry, which has created an increasingly hostile legal 
environment that burdens vulture funds internationally, 
potentially inhibiting their roles as market-enforcers, 
liquidity-providers, and information-providers.112 
Various methods have been proposed (and used) to 
constrain vulture funds, including special vulture fund 
taxes,113 return of absolute sovereign-immunity rules,114 
 
109 Vulture Funds and the Threat to Debt Relief in Africa, supra note 
93, at 12. 
110 See IMF, HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE 
AND MULTILATERAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE (MDRI)—STATISTICAL UPDATE 8 
(2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/121214.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V3A8-MNY4]. 
111 Stop Debt Vultures, JUBILEE AUSTRALIA (last visited June 12, 
2017), http://www.jubileeaustralia.org/page/work/stop-debt-vultures 
[https://perma.cc/9JHP-HLL9]. 
112 See supra Section II.B. 
113 The Irish Department of Finance has recently closed off tax-
loopholes that allowed vulture funds to avoid taxes on profits made by 
buying and selling Irish property. See Charlie Taylor, Department of 
Finance Closes Vulture Fund Loophole, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016, 5:16 
PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/department-of-finance-
closes-vulture-fund-loophole-1.2781681 [https://perma.cc/MTA8-GAH8]. In 
addition, Ireland introduced a new 20% tax on vulture fund profits off the 
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return of the comity defense,115 expanding judicial 
discretion,116 an international multi-lateral sovereign 
restructuring framework independent of the IMF,117 special 
clauses in bonds that counteract holdouts,118 and national 
anti-vulture fund legislation. Scholars have not yet arrived 
on a consensus over which method is best.119 Countries, on 
the other hand, have begun to indicate a preference for 
national anti-vulture fund legislation.120 The United Nations 
Human Rights Council, perhaps sensing this momentum, 
issued a recommendation dated October 3, 2014 that 
 
Irish property market. Donal O’Donovan, New 20pc Tax on Profits Will Hit 
Vulture Funds and Investors with Irish Property Assets, INDEPENDENT 
(Oct. 20, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.independent.ie/business/new-20pc-
tax-on-profits-will-hit-vulture-funds-and-investors-with-irish-property-
assets-35147317.html [https://perma.cc/S6J4-SVT3]. 
114 See generally Jonathan I. Blackmun & Rahul Mukhi, The 
Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and 
Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2010); Kevin Chan, 
Beijing OKs UK Ruling Blocking Vulture Fund Suit, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2011, 4:47 AM), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-beijing-oks-hk-ruling-blocking-
vulture-fund-suit-2011aug26-story.html [https://perma.cc/B9R7-NWMC]. 
115 See Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the 
Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt 
Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253 (2003). 
116 See Harvey Asiedu-Akrofi, Banks, Bonds and the American Bench: 
Exercising Judicial Discretion to Discourage Rogue Sovereign Bond 
Litigation Claims, 7 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 42 (2011). 
117 See Ryan, supra note 29, at 2515–20. 
118 Among these clauses include collective-action clauses (“CAC”) in 
bonds, which the IMF endorsed. See YAN LIU, IMF, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BONDS (Aug. 30, 2002), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J295-AVMZ]. Sovereigns may choose to exclude these 
clauses from their bonds to lower the cost of debt. In doing so, however, 
they expose themselves to potentially damaging litigation with holdouts. 
For a comprehensive history of CACs, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu 
Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51 
(2013). 
119 See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra Sections III.B–H. 
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countries adopt national anti-vulture fund legislation.121 The 
United Nations Human Rights Council condemned the 
activity of vulture funds because they (1) paralyze debt 
restructuring efforts of developing countries; (2) frustrate the 
sovereign state’s right to protect its citizens under 
international law; (3) increase the debt burden of extreme 
poverty countries; and (4) diminish the impact of debt 
relief.122 The author is sensitive to the distributive justice 
concerns from which these national legislative acts may 
arise; national legislative acts may nevertheless not be the 
optimal choice for dealing with these concerns. 
Legislation across countries is not always consistent. 
Indeed, these national regulations vary widely and shape 
different regulatory standards for vulture funds. This creates 
forum shopping between jurisdictions. The remainder of this 
Part will review the legislative responses of the United 
Kingdom, Isle of Man, Jersey, Australia, United States, 
France, and Belgium. 
B. United Kingdom 
On April 8, 2010, the United Kingdom Parliament 
enacted the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act123 
(“DRA”), which went into force on June 8, 2010.124 On May 
16, 2011, the United Kingdom took legislative action to make 
the law permanent.125 The United Kingdom enacted the DRA 
in response to a lawsuit brought by vulture funds seeking to 
 
121 Human Rights Council Res. 27/30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/27/30 
(Oct. 3, 2014). 
122 Id. 
123 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 (UK). 
124 Id. at § 10. 
125 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 (Permanent Effect) 
Order 2011 S12011/1336 (UK); see also Press Release, Her Majesty’s 
Treasury, Government Acts to Halt Profiteering on Third World Debt 
Within the UK (May 16, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
government-acts-to-halt-profiteering-on-third-world-debt-within-the-uk 
[https://perma.cc/7Z2Y-ZQS6] [hereinafter Press Release, Her Majesty’s 
Treasury]. 
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recover claims on Zambian and Liberian debt.126 Prior to 
passing the law, Parliament sought extensive public 
consultation on limiting sovereign debt recovery and 
achieved bipartisan support for the bill as a result.127 
The HIPC Initiative set a country-by-country debt 
reduction factor required of all creditors to reduce a 
sovereign’s debt to sustainable levels.128 Whereas major 
institutions had already provided their full share of the debt 
relief, commercial creditors like vulture funds lagged 
behind.129 The DRA enhanced the IMF and World Bank’s 
HIPC Initiative130 by introducing a compulsory reduction of 
debt that forced private-sector creditors to accept deals 
agreed under the HIPC Initiative by the international public 
sector.131 The DRA sought to accomplish this by restricting 
the amount commercial creditors could recover on their 
sovereign debt to 33% for potentially eligible, but not-yet-
approved HIPC.132 For countries that had already been 
approved, the DRA limited recovery to a small proportion of 
the sovereign debt consistent with the reduction factor set 
forth by the HIPC Initiative.133 Because vulture funds can 
never recover more than the HIPC Initiative, they have no 
incentive to engage in prolonged, value-destructive litigation 
in the United Kingdom’s courts. Moreover, because the DRA 
applies to foreign judgments or arbitration awards on 
qualifying debt, vulture funds cannot easily shop for more 
 
126 See John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. 
Republic of Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt 
Funds, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1696 (2014). 
127 James Bai, Stop Them Circling: Addressing Vulture Funds in 
Australian Law, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 703, 725 (2013). 
128 Sophie Hughes, Simon James, Andrew Yianni & Deborah 
Zandstra, The HIPC Debt Relief Bill: Making Forgiveness Compulsory, 4 
LAW & FIN. MKT. REV. 269, 269 (2010). 
129 See IMF, supra note 100. 
130 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 § 1(2); see also 
Press Release, Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra note 125. 
131 Hughes et al., supra note 128, at 269. 
132 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 § 4(3). 
133 Id. § 4(2). 
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favorable laws and ask U.K. courts to enforce the 
judgment.134 
The DRA reinforces the importance of the HIPC Initiative 
by binding the Debtor (sovereign state) to the HIPC’s terms 
as well. The DRA does so by excluding from the DRA’s scope 
all sovereign debt that the Debtor did not “make an offer to 
compromise on comparable Initiative terms.”135 Thus, if the 
sovereign state does not offer the amount set forth in HIPC 
Initiative recovery, it may be on the hook for several factors 
of that amount. This encourages the sovereign to make the 
creditor an offer to settle. At the very worst, the state must 
offer the creditor terms comparable to the HIPC Initiative 
terms, which prevents the HIPCs pointing to the HIPC 
Initiative threshold as a maximum, negotiating a settlement 
price below this threshold, and thereby securing a windfall. 
More importantly, however, because the DRA will not apply 
to a passive sovereign’s debt, the DRA encourages the 
sovereign nation to actively “make” offers and direct their 
debt restructuring, rather than free-ride on the debt relief.136 
Finally, the DRA waives HIPCs’ sovereign debt issued before 
the commencement of the DRA and prior to the HIPC 
decision point.137 This means HIPCs are required to honor 
short-term debt incurred after and unrelated to the reason 
for their designation as an HIPC country.138 Studies indicate 
that this law will have a very beneficial impact on HIPC 
countries. The U.K. Treasury estimated, for example, that 
the DRA could save poor countries an estimated £145 million 
in total over six years.139 
 
134 Bai, supra note 127, at 727. 
135 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 § 6(1). 
136 Bai, supra note 127, at 727. 
137 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22 § 1(3). 
138 Bai, supra note 127, at 726. 
139 See Press Release, Her Majesty’s Treasury, supra note 125. 
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C. Isle of Man 
On December 11, 2012, Isle of Man, a self-governing 
British Crown dependency, signed and enacted the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (Limitation on Debt Recovery) Act 
2012.140 In form and substance, the Act essentially mirrors 
the U.K. legislation. 
However, the Isle of Man legislation is unique because it 
preemptively bars vulture funds from exploiting HIPC 
without any evidence of prior vulture fund activity within 
the Crown dependency. As such, the Act responds to a 
problem that was non-existent in its jurisdiction. If 
legislation in jurisdictions without vulture activity continue 
to trend this way, anti-vulture funds regulation may amount 
to a complete ban of vulture funds from the distressed debt 
market. 
D. Jersey 
The United Kingdom’s DRA did not cover Jersey, so the 
Crown dependency of the United Kingdom was broadly 
regarded as a loophole for recovery. In 2011, New York 
vulture fund FG Hemisphere used the Jersey courts to sue 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.141 In the summer of 2012, 
the Jersey courts ruled against FG Hemisphere’s attempt to 
sue a state-owned mining company for $100 million on a $3 
million debt.142 To unambiguously close the Jersey loophole, 
 
140 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Limitation on Debt Recovery) 
Act 2012 (Isle of Man); see also Press Release, Cabinet Office, Isle of Man 
Introduces Legislation to Outlaw Vulture Funds (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.gov.im/news/2012/dec/12/isle-of-man-introduces-legislation-to-
outlaw-vulture-funds/ [https://perma.cc/G48X-9KSW]. 
141 Greg Palast, Maggie O’Kane & Chavala Madlena, Vulture Funds 
Await Jersey Decision on Poor Countries’ Debts, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 
2011, 6:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/ 
nov/15/vulture-funds-jersey-decision [https://perma.cc/6R4Z-8VFQ]. 
142 See Amber Przybysz, Anti-Vulture Fund Legislation Introduced in 
Jersey as One Vulture Swoops in on Argentina, JUBILEE USA NETWORK 
(Oct. 22, 2012), http://jubileeusa.typepad.com/blog_the_debt/2012/10/anti-
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however, a debt relief law similar to the U.K. DRA was 
proposed on October 1, 2012 in Jersey.143 After an 
independent expert made an official submission to the 
government on the need for anti-vulture legislature,144 
Jersey enacted the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) 
(Jersey) Law 2013, which came into force on March 1, 
2013.145 
It is clear that the Jersey legislature used the DRA as a 
model for crafting this law. Like the U.K. and Isle of Man 
laws, the Jersey legislation seeks to support debt relief 
efforts intended to assist the world’s poorest and most 
heavily indebted countries.146 The Jersey law adopts the 
DRA’s language almost verbatim in a variety of sections, 
including qualifying debt with reference to the HIPC 
Initiative,147 limiting the amount recoverable by a proportion 
from the Initiative,148 extending the law to foreign judgments 
and arbitrations,149 and providing exceptions that incentivize 
the Debtor (sovereign state) to not actively make an offer to 
compromise the proceedings.150 
E. Australia 
The initiative to draft anti-vulture fund legislation in 





144 Cephas Lumina, Sovereign Debt and Human Rights: The United 
Nations Approach, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
WORK 263 n.59 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Cernic, eds., 
2014). 
145 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) (Jersey) Law 2013; see also 
Press Release, Jersey Government, Debt Relief Law Comes into Force 
(Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.gov.je/News/2013/Pages/DebtRelief.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U5UE-HGZ3]. 
146 Press Release, Jersey Government, supra note 145. 
147 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) (Jersey) Law 2013, § 2. 
148 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) (Jersey) Law 2013, §§ 5, 6. 
149 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) (Jersey) Law 2013, § 7. 
150 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) (Jersey) Law 2013, § 8(1)(b). 
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Jersey.151 In November 2010, FG Hemisphere pursued a 
claim against the Democratic Republic of Congo in the NSW 
Supreme Court in Australia.152 FG Hemisphere sought and 
won a judgment forcing the DRC to sell its shares in an 
Australian mining company operating in Congo for $30 
million.153 However, in February 2011, the United Nations 
Independent Expert on Foreign Debt and Human Rights 
called upon the Government of Australia to pass national 
legislation that limited vulture funds’ ability to use 
Australian courts to recover claims.154 
Once again, the DRA model impacted a foreign 
jurisdiction. On June 25, 2012, the Australian Federation 
Chamber debated legislative action to protect the HIPC 
Initiative,155 and the legislators regarded the DRA as model 
legislation that Australia should adopt.156 The Federation 
Chamber discussed odious debt157 and the trending response 
of the international community to vulture funds.158  
 
151 This same dispute dragged into the Bahamas, South Africa, the 
United States and Hong Kong. See Bai, supra note 127, at 704. Of these 
jurisdictions, national anti-vulture funds legislation was proposed in every 
jurisdiction except for Hong Kong. Such legislation was unnecessary in 
Hong Kong because its courts outright rejected FG Capital Management’s 
claims on the basis of absolute sovereign immunity of the mainland. See 
Chan, supra note 114. Two years after the ruling, there is evidence that 
calls for regulation appeared in the media, but this never translated into 
legislation or legislative conversation. See e.g., Andrew Mak, Time for 
Hong Kong to Regulate Predatory Vulture Funds, CHINA DAILY ASIA (Nov. 
19, 2013, 7:38 AM), http://www.chinadailyasia.com/opinion/201311/19/ 
content_15099719.html [https://perma.cc/5TY9-D8M3]. 
152 See JUBILEE AUSTL., supra note 111. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Federation Chamber, 25 
June 2012, 7790 (Anna Burke, Deputy Speaker) (Austl.). 
156 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Federation Chamber, 25 
June 2012, 7789 (Hon. Melissa Parke) (Austl.). 
157 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Federation Chamber, 25 
June 2012, 7789 (Hon. Andrew Leigh) (Austl.). 
158 Id. (discusses the need to see how Hong Kong and China will 
respond to vulture funds). 
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However, the legislature has yet to pass any anti-vulture 
fund legislation. 
F. United States 
On August 1, 2008, Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-
CA, 43rd District) introduced the first national anti-vulture 
funds legislation in the United States.159 The House of 
Representatives shelved the bill for committee review. On 
June 18, 2009, Ms. Waters re-introduced the same bill, titled 
“Stop Very Unscrupulous Loan Transfers from 
Underprivileged Countries to Rich, Exploitive Funds Act,” or 
also known as the “Stop Vulture Funds Act.”160 Unlike pieces 
of legislation in other nations that warn of how immoral 
vulture funds’ actions are, the Stop Vulture Funds Act 
focuses on deleterious consequences that U.S. vulture funds’ 
conduct has on the foreign relations of the United States.161 
The proposed legislation seeks “[t]o prevent speculation 
and profiteering in the defaulted debt of certain poor 
countries,”162 which refers to the HIPC Initiative countries, 
with some exceptions and additions.163 The Act does this by 
imposing a punitive fine on “vulture creditors” equal to the 
total amount sought through the sovereign debt 
profiteering164 and by creating mandatory disclosure 
requirements that expose vulture creditors to judicial 
scrutiny.165 Under the Act, “vulture creditors” refers to any 
person, except other sovereigns or International Financial 
 
159 Stop Vulture Funds Act, H.R. 6769, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). 
160 Stop Vulture Funds Act, H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
161 Id. § 2(12). 
162 H.R. 2932. 
163 These exceptions include countries that engage in gross violations 
of human rights, that have excessive expenditures on military operations, 
those that promote terrorism, or those fail to cooperate with the United 
States on narcotics matters. H.R. 2932 § 6. The Secretary of Treasury 
maintains a list of all qualified poor countries, which includes those that 
borrow from the International Development Association. Id. § 6(a)(2). 
164 Id. § 4(b). 
165 Id. § 5(b). 
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Institutions,166 who acquires defaulted sovereign debt of a 
qualified poor country at a discount to face value.167 
Both bills were referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Committee on Financial Services, but 
neither has gone to a vote.168 
G. France (Proposed Legislation) 
On March 30, 2016, the French National Assembly 
started considering legislative action to promote 
transparency, anti-corruption, and economic modernization 
with the “Sapin II Bill.”169 The proposed Bill attached anti-
vulture fund legislation to Article XXIV of the Bill,170 and 
functioned similarly to the United Kingdom’s DRA by 
limiting the claims brought by vulture funds against 
sovereign states facing default.171 Additionally, the French 
law would enlarge judicial discretion and enhance the court’s 
role in countering vulture funds. It does this by requiring 
vulture funds to obtain court authorization before 
commencing any litigation for seizure of debt recovery.172 
 
166 The definition for “vulture creditors” in H.R. 2932 follows the 
definition for “vulture creditor” under section 1701(c)(2) of the 
International Financial Institutions Act. Id. § 3(1). 
167 Id. 
168 H.R. 2932; see also Stop Vulture Funds Act, H.R. 6796, 110th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). 
169 Bénédicte Graulle et al., The Sapin II Bill: A Potential Game-
Changer in French Corruption Enforcement, JONES DAY (May 2016), 
http://www.jonesday.com/The-Sapin-II-Bill-A-Potential-Game-Changer-in-
French-Corruption-Enforcement-05-05-2016/?RSS=true. 
170 Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, L’ «amendement Poutine» adopté dans la 
loi Sapin 2, LE FIGARO (Oct. 6, 2016, 3:53 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/ 
conjoncture/2016/06/10/20002-20160610ARTFIG00199-l-amendement-
poutine-adopte-dans-la-loi-sapin-2.php [https://perma.cc/KZW3-ZS89]. 
171 Adrien Paredes-Vanheule, France to Restrict Vulture Funds’ 
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The French legislature appeared to have been motivated 
by NML Capital’s victory over Argentina, by the UN Human 
Rights Report,173 and by the Belgian law enacted in 
September 2015, which is similar to the French draft 
legislation.174 However, the Senate adopted a version of this 
bill on November 3, 2016 with Article XXIV deleted in the 
final revision.175 
H. Belgium’s Anti-Vulture Act 
1. Background 
In January 2008, Belgium’s Federal Parliament adopted 
its first legislation to “safeguard Belgian funds disbursed 
towards development cooperation and debt relief from the 
actions taken by vulture funds.”176 The law forbade the 
seizure or transfer of development assistance between 
parties and prohibited creditors from recovering interest 
owed to vulture creditors.177 
On July 12, 2015, the Belgian Federal Parliament passed 
its second national legislation against vulture funds, known 
as the Anti-Vulture Funds Law,178 which became effective on 
 
173 Plateforme Dette & Développement, Loi Sapin 2: L’Assemblée 
confirme sa volonté de réguler l’action des fonds vautours mais ne leur 
coupe pas les ailes, CADTM: COMITÉ POUR L’ABOLITION DES DETTES 
ILLÉGITIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.cadtm.org/Loi-Sapin-2-L-
Assemblee-confirme [https://perma.cc/2J24-EUH4]. 
174 See Paredes-Vanheule, supra note 171. 
175 Projet de loi relatif à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption 
et à la modernisation de la vie économique, SÉNAT (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201606/le_senat_examine_la
_loi_sapin_2.html (legislative history of the Sapin II Billl). 
176 Bai, supra note 127, at 722 (quoting The Chamber of 
Representatives, Project de loi visant à empêcher la saisie ou la cession des 
fonds publics destinés à la cooperation international, notamment par la 
technique des fonds vautours (2008) Belgian Federal Parliament). 
177 Id. 
178 Loi relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vauteurs [Anti-
Vulture Funds Law] of July 12, 2015, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official 
Gazette of Belgium] Sept. 11, 2015, 57357. 
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September 12, 2015.179 Shortly after passing the Anti-
Vulture Funds Law, Belgium’s Federal Parliament inserted 
an act into Article 1412 (collectively, the “Belgian Laws”) of 
the Judicial Code (“Article 1412”) that governed seizures of 
property belonging to foreign countries.180 Despite separate 
ratification, the two legislative acts work in tandem with 
each other to achieve their goals. 
2. What Does the Legislation Do? 
Unlike anti-vulture fund legislation passed in other 
countries, the Belgian Laws are very short.181 Article 1412, 
which fits on one page, announces that sovereign property, 
including bank accounts, is generally not seizable by 
creditors.182 There are three exceptions to this rule: first, 
where the sovereign state expressly and specifically agrees to 
the seizability of the property; second, where the property 
was earmarked specifically for the satisfaction of a demand 
that is the subject of enforcement or “authentic” private title; 
and third, if it is established that the property is specifically 
in use or intended for use by the foreign power, except for 
public non-commercial services, that the property is located 
in the country’s territory, and there is enforceable or 
“authentic” private title to the property.183 
The Anti-Vulture Funds Law, on the other hand, deals 
specifically with claims rather than sovereign property. The 
Anti-Vulture Funds Law vanquishes the rights of claimants 
that pursue an “illegitimate advantage” on sovereign 
distressed debt.184 To determine what constitutes an 
illegitimate advantage, the legislation provides a two-prong 
 
179 Id. 
180 See CODE JUDICIAIRE/GERECHTELIJK WETBOEK [C.JUD./GER.W.] 
art.1412 (Belg.), http://www.etaamb.be/fr/loi-du-23-aout-2015_n2015009 
459.html [https://perma.cc/5WG5-TS59]. 
181 See Anti-Vulture Funds Law. 
182 C.JUD./GER.W. art.1412 § 1. 
183 Id. § 2. 
184 Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2. 
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test.185 First, there must be a manifest difference between 
the purchase price and the face value of the loan, or between 
the purchase price and the sums actually claimed by the 
creditor.186 The second prong requires at least one of the 
following criteria to also be met: (1) the debtor State is in an 
actual or imminent state of insolvency; (2) the creditor’s 
headquarters are in a tax haven;187 (3) the creditor 
systematically uses legal procedures to recover on its loans; 
(4) the creditor refused to cooperate with the debtor State; (5) 
the creditor abused the weakness of the State to negotiate a 
clearly imbalanced restructuring; or (6) repayment of the 
amounts claimed by the creditor would have a negative effect 
on the public finances of the debtor State.188 
The Belgian Laws have been met with mixed results. 
Despite the two-prong test, practitioners remain uncertain 
as to the legislation’s scope.189 Some have criticized the 
Belgian Laws for their potentially negative impact on 
Belgium as a financial center.190 Many others, however, have 
offered praise. The French legislature, for example, proposed 
a bill similar to the Belgian Laws in June 2016.191 The 
Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt also 




187 “Tax haven” is a rough approximation for a more complex 
definition outlined in the Anti-Vulture Funds Law, which provides a three-
party disjunctive test. Specifically, this test is: are the headquarters on the 
list of states or non-cooperative jurisdictions established by the Financial 
Action Task Force (“FATF”), or referred to in Article 307, § 1, paragraph 5, 
of the Code of income tax of 1992, or that refuses to negotiate and sign an 
agreement in accordance with OECD standards which provides the 
automatic exchange of information in tax and banking matters with 
Belgium. See Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2; see also infra Appendix A. 
188 Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2. 
189 See RICHELLE, supra note 6, at 3. 
190 Id. 
191 See supra notes 169–175 and accompanying text. 
192 CNCD, Intervention du CNCD-11.11.11, CADTM et 11.11.11 
koepel van de Vlaamse Noord-Zuidbeweging dans le recours en annulation 
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Independent Expert on foreign debt and human rights, Juan 
Pablo Bohoslavsky, noted the international importance of the 
Belgian legislation and praised it as the most 
“comprehensive cover against excessive financial claims by 
vulture funds.”193 
3. Constitutional Challenge 
While political entities have taken to praising the 
regulation, vulture funds have taken to litigation to protect 
their rights. On March 2–3, 2016, NML Capital Ltd. 
(“NML”), a vulture fund incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands,194 raised constitutional challenges to the Anti-
Vulture Funds Law195 and Article 1412196 before the Belgian 
Constitutional Court. The Article 1412 challenge was met by 
Yukos Universal Limited,197 a firm from the Isle of Man.198 
 
devant la Cour Constitutionnelle du fonds vautour NML Capital Ltd. 
contre la loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des 
fonds vautours, CADTM (2016) http://www.cncd.be/IMG/pdf/ 
factsheet_fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YH3-49NG]. 
193 Press Release, UN Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, 
Belgian Legislation Against Vulture Funds Should Be Preserved – UN 
Rights Expert Urges (June 15, 2016) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20106&LangID=E 
[https://perma.cc/QLN9-UKEG]. 
194 NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina [2011] UKSC 31 2 AC 
495, 496, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2010-0040-
judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLB8-LFTJ]. 
195 Cour Constitutionnelle [CC][Constitutional Court] case no. 6371 
(FR) (ongoing, no decision reached yet), accessed at http://www.const-
court.be/fr/common/home.html. 
196 Cour Constitutionnelle [CC][Constitutional Court] case no. 6372 
(FR) (ongoing, no decision reached yet), accessed at http://www.const-
court.be/fr/common/home.html. 
197 Cour Constitutionnelle [CC][Constitutional Court] case no. 6373 
(NL) (ongoing, no decision reached yet), accessed at http://www.const-
court.be/fr/common/home.html. The document mistakenly refers to Yukos 
Universal Limited as “Ykos Universal Limited.” 
198 Yukos Universal Limited v. Russian Federation (Isle of Man v. 
RU), PCA Case No. AA227 31 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), 
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NML presented three arguments in support of its 
constitutional challenge. First, NML argued that the law 
breached its property rights.199 Second, NML proposed the 
laws wrongfully discriminate between creditors of sovereigns 
and other creditors and arbitrarily determine some claims to 
be legitimate while others as illegitimate.200 Finally, NML 
submits that these laws violate the inviolability of 
contracts.201 After almost a year, this constitutional 
challenge remains ongoing and unresolved by the Belgian 
Constitutional Court. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
Regulations that restrict the rights of a particular group 
of creditors should consider the benefits and harms created 
by that group, and in circumstances where these benefits are 
extraordinary, the lawmakers should enact legislation that 
curtails the harms without eliminating the benefits. 
Specifically, national anti-vulture funds legislation that 
addresses holdout problems should (1) be mindful that 
vulture funds create more efficient capital markets;202 (2) 
function as a counterbalance to the moral hazard problem 
posed by sovereigns;203 (3) provide liquidity on the secondary 
market for distressed debt;204 and (4) provide information to 
the market as corruption-exposers.205 While the DRA is more 
sensitive to these benefits, the Belgian Laws are not. If 
future legislation is adopted by other nations, such 
regulation might eliminate the secondary distressed debt 




199 See Vivien, supra note 8. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See supra Section II.B.1. 
203 See supra Section II.B.2. 
204 See supra Section II.B.3. 
205 See supra Section II.B.4. 
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A. By Eliminating the Ability to Profit on Sovereign 
Debt Claims, the Belgian Laws Eliminate the 
Secondary Distressed Debt Market and Expose 
Sovereigns to Other Inefficiencies 
One issue the Belgian Laws address is the incentive for 
vulture funds to buy claims during the late stages of a 
negotiation in a sovereign restructuring, which may cause 
holdouts and further delays.206 For example, if negotiations 
are going poorly and creditors believe they will only receive 
10% of the loan’s purchase price, creditors will be 
incentivized to sell their claims to vulture funds for 15% of 
the purchase price. Vulture funds would be willing to pay 
this premium because their expected return may be higher 
due to their resources and expertise to litigate their claims. 
After purchasing these claims, however, vulture funds will 
not be content to restructure for 15%. Rather, they will seek 
to maximize gains. Thus, such claims trading may prolong a 
voluntary sovereign restructuring. 
The Belgian Laws address this problem by limiting the 
creditor’s recovery amount to the price paid, thereby 
eliminating the incentive for the vulture fund to purchase 
the loan at 15%.207 Two observations follow. First, claims will 
not be uniform and will have different values under this 
mechanism. Generally, the closer to default an investor 
purchases a sovereign loan, the lower its purchase price and 
quality, and the less likely a creditor will receive any 
recovery. Regardless of the expected return the creditor 
expects, however, all creditors’ rights are still the same. 
Under the Belgian Laws’ restriction, however, early 
purchasers’ rights might be more valuable, and as such, 
early purchasers may receive greater recovery. 
The second observation, however, is that regardless of 
whether the investor purchases early or late, the highest her 
 
206 See Phillips & Johnston supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
207 Loi relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vauteurs [Anti-
Vulture Funds Law] of July 12, 2015, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official 
Gazette of Belgium] Sept. 11, 2015, 57357. 
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return on investment could ever be is the same: zero. By 
pegging the recovery price to the purchase price, the Belgian 
Laws vanquish the ability of sovereign distressed debt 
investors to recover any profit on their investments. No 
creditor would ever purchase a profitless loan on which she 
would lose money because of the time value of money. On the 
one hand, this regulation accomplishes its goal of 
discouraging distressed debt investors from purchasing 
odious debt. On the other hand, by eliminating the ability for 
distressed debt investors to profit, the Belgian Laws 
eliminate liquidity-providers and essentially shut down the 
secondary market for sovereign distressed debt. 
Eradicating vulture funds from this market wrongly 
dismisses their benefits and may lead to deleterious 
consequences. For example, without the ability to make a 
profit, vulture funds lose the incentive to provide liquidity to 
suffering banks with distressed sovereign debt on their 
balance sheets.208 The mechanism that helped avert an 
international debt crisis in the 1980s would dissipate.209 
Furthermore, banks would recognize the absence of these 
liquidity-providers on the market, and the cost of capital 
would rise. It is true that banks may become more careful in 
issuing loans. However, this additional diligence would make 
debt more costly and difficult to raise. Financially distressed 
countries desperate to finance development, education, and 
medical services would be disproportionately hurt. 
Furthermore, the burden to perform due diligence shifts 
from being a responsibility shared by both the banks and the 
sovereign into a unilateral responsibility of the bank. In the 
absence of vulture fund regulation, the sovereign state 
shares an incentive to monitor its capital structure.210 With 
this elimination of vulture funds, however, financially 
healthy countries that can still obtain debt from banks will 
know ex ante that no market actor will hold them 
 
208 See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
209 Id. 
210 See supra Section II.B.1. 
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accountable. The sovereign will be less careful knowing that 
if it makes a bad decision, at worst, its taxpayers will pay the 
bill, and at best, the country may be bailed out by debt relief. 
As such, these financially healthy countries lose the 
incentive to monitor their capital structure and suffer from a 
moral hazard problem. 
B. Trading Odious Debt is a Problem; Trading Other 
Sovereign Debt is Not 
The Belgian Laws clearly seek to resolve problems 
brought by trading odious debt. The Anti-Vulture Funds Law 
restricts “reimbursement of the amounts claimed by the 
creditor would have a clearly adverse impact on the public 
finances of the debtor state and would likely to compromise 
the socio-economic development of its people.”211 
However, the Belgian Laws otherwise fail to distinguish 
between odious debt and other sovereign debt. By trading 
sovereign debt, vultures may encourage more efficient 
capital structures.212 Trading odious debt, however, confers 
no benefit to the market and is neither Pareto nor Kaldor-
Hicks efficient.213 Legislation that limits vulture funds’ 
rights should be responsive to this difference.214 The Belgian 
Laws, however, broadly restrict the rights of all creditors 
holding claims with an “illegitimate advantage,” regardless 
of whether or not the claim arises from an HIPC country or 
from the United States.215 
The first prong of the “illegitimate advantage test” looks 
for a clear difference between the purchase price and face 
value of the loan, or between the purchase price and the 
sums claimed by the creditor.216 First, this may shut down 
the possibility of collecting accrued interest by the defaulting 
 
211 Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2; see also infra Appendix A. 
212 See supra Section II.B.1. 
213 See supra Section II.C.3. 
214 See supra Section III.A. 
215 Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2. 
216 See supra Section III.H.2; see also Anti-Vulture Funds Law, art. 2. 
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sovereign. Second, this results in a dramatic shift in the 
bargaining process. While it is unclear how much of a 
difference is necessary to meet this guideline, any creditor 
negotiating her rights will be at the mercy of the sovereign in 
the Belgian jurisdiction. Even without the profit-limiting 
provision that dismantles the secondary distressed debt 
market,217 the uncertainty created by the first-prong of the 
illegitimate advantage test decreases the value of the loans 
and makes trading them prohibitively expensive. 
C. The Belgian Legislation’s Definition of “Illegitimate 
Advantage” Wrongly Absorbs Non-Vulture Funds 
Under Its Reach 
The Belgian legislature never explicitly defines a vulture 
fund and instead uses the two-prong test of the Anti-Vulture 
Funds Law to restrict the rights of creditors with 
characteristics of vulture funds. Some of these combinations 
of characteristics, however, can apply to non-vulture fund 
creditors. For example, an individual farmer can 
theoretically pursue significant unpaid interest while the 
sovereign is insolvent. This meets both the first prong and 
second prong.218 
For this reason, the “illegitimate advantage test” may 
again prove difficult to import to other jurisdictions. To the 
extent sovereign states seek to borrow from Belgium’s 
legislation, they should be careful to adopt legislation 
curtailed to the specific conditions of their own markets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Belgian Laws do not resolve the problems posed by 
vulture funds in a thoughtful way and other countries should 
be skeptical in adopting a model that follows the Belgian 
model. To the extent nations continue deciding to implement 
national anti-vulture funds regulation, they should limit the 
 
217 See supra Section IV.B. 
218 See supra Section III.H.2. 
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scope of its application to odious debt to avoid curtailing the 
entire secondary distressed debt market and to maintain a 
flexible market approach to market problems. Moreover, 
rather than applying broadly to all vulture funds, and even 
individuals that free-ride on vulture funds efforts, such 
countries should pass legislation, like the DRA, that 
enhances active settlement discussions without 
compromising the bargaining power or rights of either the 
sovereign or the vulture funds. While politicians may 
continue to praise the comprehensiveness of the Belgian 
approach to regulating vulture funds, the United Kingdom’s 
approach with the DRA is more sensitive to the costs and 
benefits of vulture funds. 
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APPENDIX A 
Article 1 




Where a claimant is pursuing an illegitimate advantage 
by acquiring a loan or debt on a State, its rights in respect of 
the debtor State will be limited to the price paid to redeem 
such loan or debt. 
 
Regardless of the law governing the legal relationship 
between the creditor and the debtor State, no enforceable 
title can be obtained in Belgium, and no precautionary 
measures or enforcement may be taken in Belgium at the 
request of that creditor in connection with a payment to be 
charged in Belgium, if such payment gives to the creditor an 
illegitimate advantage as defined by law. 
 
Pursuing an illegitimate advantage exists where there is 
a manifest disproportion between the purchase price and 
face value of the loan or receivable, or between the purchase 
price of the loan or receivable and the sums actually claimed 
by the creditor. 
 
To constitute an illegitimate advantage, the manifest 
disproportion referred to in paragraph 2 shall be 
supplemented by at least one of the following criteria: 
 
•  The debtor State was in an actual or imminent 
state of insolvency at the time of redemption of the 
loan or receivable; 
 
•  The creditor has its headquarters in a State or 
Territory that is: 
 
a)  On the list of states or non-cooperative 
jurisdictions established by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF); or 
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b)  Referred to in Article 307, § 1, paragraph 5, of 
the Code of income tax of 1992; or 
 
c)  On the list established by the King that refuses 
to negotiate and sign an agreement in 
accordance with OECD standards which 
provides the automatic exchange of information 
in tax and banking matters with Belgium from 
2015; 
 
• The creditor systematically uses legal procedures 
for the reimbursement of the loan or loans 
previously redeemed; 
 
• The creditor refused to cooperate with the debtor 
State restructuring debt; 
 
• The creditor has abused the weak situation of the 
debtor State to negotiate a clearly imbalanced 
repayment agreement; or 
 
• Reimbursement of the amounts claimed by the 
creditor would have a clearly adverse impact on 
the public finances of the debtor State and would 
likely to compromise the socio-economic 
development of its people. 
 
Article 3 
This Act applies subject to the application of 
International Treaties, the EU or bilateral treaties. 
 
